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THE CHINESE MARKET FOR U.S. PORK EXPORTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank, living 
standards in China (if measured using 
purchasing power parity) are about equal 
to those that existed in Taiwan twenty-
five years ago (The Economist 1992).  
The same source suggests that when 
incomes in China catch up to the level 
that exists in Taiwan today, the Chinese 
economy will be equal in size to the 
combined economies of the countries 
comprising the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development (i.e., Canada, the European 
Union, Japan, and other industrialized 
countries). 
 
If this level of development is to be 
achieved in China, markets will have to 
be allowed to work freely, which means 
that consumers must be allowed to 
increase their consumption of meat, 
dairy, alcohol, and fish to levels 
commensurate with their growing 
incomes.  However, China must achieve 
this consumption growth with only 9 
percent of the world’s arable land.  Table 
1 compares China’s arable land mass 
and population with those of the United 
States, Europe, and the Russian 
Federation. Based on the data presented 
in Table 1, China must feed 13.0 people 
for each hectare of arable land, whereas 
Europe must feed 4.1 people, the United 
States must feed only 1.4 person, and the 
Russian Federation must feed 1.1 person 
per arable hectare. 
 
It has become obvious to most observers 
that China will need to import feed 
grains or livestock products to achieve 
consumer diets similar to those of the 
developed world.  Coyle (1996), for 
example, cites eight different studies, all 
of which project that China will be a 
large net importer of grains (30 million 
to 50 million metric tons) early in the 
next century. 
 
China’s switchover from a net exporter 
to a net importer of feed grains has 
enormous implications for U.S. pork 
producers.  Countries that export feed 
grains, as China did in the early 1990s, 
must sell them at a discount to world 
market prices (to cover transportation 
costs).  Countries that import feed grains 
must pay a premium over world market 
prices.  Pork producers in Japan and 
Taiwan, for example, pay about twice as 
much for feed as do pork producers in 
Iowa. 
 
 
Table 1.  Arable land mass and population of China compared to data for the United 
States, the Russian Federation, and Europe 
  Arable Land Population 
  (1,000 hectares) (1,000 people) 
China  92,708 1,208,842 
Europe  122,174 505,502 
Russian Federation 129,500 147,370 
United States 185,742 260,631 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 1994.  
China is in the middle of a transition 
from Iowa-type corn prices to Japanese-
type corn prices—a transition that will 
make the world’s largest pork industry 
uncompetitive with imported products.  
Consider also that (1) Chinese consumer 
tastes are an ideal complement to U.S. 
tastes in that consumers in each country 
will pay a premium for cuts and products 
that consumers in the other country 
dislike; (2) livestock feeding industries 
have proven to be extremely mobile in 
response to economic incentives; (3) 
China, which currently has a larger trade 
surplus with the United States than does 
Japan, hopes to join the World Trade 
Organization in the near future; and (4) 
the United States has a large competitive 
advantage in supplying China with large 
volumes of the cuts consumers will 
demand at an acceptable price.  This 
evidence suggests that U.S. pork 
producers currently have an 
unprecedented opportunity to create 
market growth. 
 
The first part of this report discusses the 
supply and demand situation for the 
Chinese pork market through 2007.  The 
second section provides an in-depth 
analysis of the Chinese market for pork 
variety meats and the potential benefits 
that will accrue if this market is opened.  
The last section lists actions that would 
allow U.S. pork producers to make the 
most optimal use of these new 
opportunities. 
 
 
Pork Supply and Demand in China to 
2007 
 
Data on the size of the Chinese pork 
market is readily available, but the 
quality of the data is extremely suspect.  
For example, the USDA, which uses 
disappearance data from the Chinese 
government, shows a per capita 
consumption of meat and poultry of 42 
kilograms in 1996.  Huang (1996) shows 
a per capita consumption level of less 
than half of this amount. 
 
The data from Huang originate from 
household expenditure surveys in which 
consumers actually report how much 
they buy.  The USDA (1996) data are 
derived by guessing how many hogs 
were slaughtered and then calculating 
how much meat had disappeared. 
 
The survey data will miss consumption 
that was obtained for free, and the 
disappearance data will include spoiled 
meat and will be upwardly biased if local 
officials inflate their production amounts 
to meet production criteria.  This issue is 
important for two reasons.  First, some 
have looked at the high per capita 
numbers from the USDA and predicted a 
decrease in the rate of growth in per 
capita meat consumption as consumers 
reach saturation.  Second, 10 percent 
growth from a 42-kilogram base is much 
greater than 10 percent growth from a 
20-kilogram base. 
 
To a certain extent, these errors will tend 
to offset each other because a prediction 
that reduces expected growth from 10 
percent to 5 percent due to market 
saturation might well come up with the 
same projection as one that predicts 10 
percent growth from a much smaller 
base.   
 
The importance of the per capita number 
led Dermot Hayes, the co-author of this 
report, to conduct a field study on this 
topic during the summer of 1995. 
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A large potential for increased pork 
consumption clearly exists among rural 
consumers and lower-middle-class (and 
below) urban consumers in China.  
These groups together comprise about 90 
percent of the population.   Therefore, 
the projections contained herein do not 
include a saturation effect. 
 
Estimates by Hayes and others show that 
10 percent income growth in China will 
cause pork demand to increase by 6 
percent.  Most projections (e.g., WEFA) 
show continued 10 percent per capita 
income growth that, coupled with 
population growth of 1.2 percent, should 
cause pork demand to increase by 6 
percent to 7 percent per year.  This 
outward shift in demand will cause an 
increase in either prices or consumption, 
depending on whether or not the 
government allows pork imports. 
 
Interviews with top government 
officials, conducted by Hayes during a 
second field trip in the summer of 1996, 
indicated that there is very little 
possibility that China will open its pork 
muscle meat market to outside 
competition. (As discussed in the next 
section, however, there is a strong 
possibility that the Chinese government 
will open the market for pork variety 
meats.) 
 
In the absence of any liberalization in 
China’s pork import policies, Chinese 
demand for pork will have to be met by 
Chinese pork producers, who in turn will 
increasingly depend on imported grain.  
The demand increase will force prices 
up, which will allow Chinese pork 
producers to modestly expand 
production in the face of increased 
production costs.  Therefore, the analysis 
that follows shows 2.5 percent annual 
growth in Chinese pork consumption. 
 
This relatively slow consumption growth 
and higher internal prices will make 
Chinese pork exports less competitive.  
However, the Chinese government has 
shown itself willing to subsidize its pork 
industry and, by extension, pork exports 
(USDA).  The Chinese government 
accomplishes this by subsidizing feed 
inputs for some smaller producers and by 
allowing the state-owned processing 
industry to operate at a loss.  Most of 
China's pork exports consist of vacuum-
packaged muscle meats.  This meat 
appears to be of good quality and 
competes directly with U.S. product in 
some destination markets (e.g., Russia 
and Hong Kong). 
 
For much of 1996, the cost of hog feed 
in China was RMB 2 per kilogram, or 
11.5 cents per pound (Hope Group).  
Using the feed conversion factor 
obtained by the best operators (3.6:1) 
implies a feed cost  of about $40 per 
hundredweight, which is about 
equivalent to the total U.S. cost of 
production.  (U.S. feed costs ranged 
from 5 cents to 8 cents per pound over 
the same period.)  Add to this U.S. feed 
cost advantage a quality differential of 
about 30 percent, reflecting the poor 
carcass composition of much of the 
Chinese inventory (attributable in part to 
low protein in hog diets) and the 
presence of foot-and-mouth disease in 
China.  Also, the Chinese packing and 
transportation industries operate at a 
much lower level of efficiency than do 
the U.S. industries.  These U.S. 
advantages imply that, in the absence of 
subsidies, China cannot compete against 
the United States at today’s costs. 
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As China’s production costs grow within 
a protected environment, the U.S. 
advantage will increase.  Although a 
more formal analysis of these subsidies 
would be required to prove a World 
Trade Organization (WTO) case, U.S. 
pork producers would benefit from a 
WTO entry agreement for China 
prohibiting direct and indirect use of 
export subsidies. 
 
 
Projections 
 
As mentioned, the Chinese government 
places a strong emphasis on self-
sufficiency in pork.  This stance means 
that China's negotiators at the WTO 
accession meetings will request 
permission to maintain the current        
de facto ban on pork imports.  However, 
the United States is in a position to 
obtain some concessions from China, 
and one of these concessions might be to 
open China’s pork market.  Therefore, 
two sets of projections—each 
representing one of the above 
outcomes—are presented.  Both 
scenarios assume that Chinese pork 
exports will decrease.  In the self-
sufficiency (baseline) scenario, the 
decrease occurs because  internal prices 
increase.  In the WTO concession 
scenario, the decrease occurs because 
free trade in pork products precludes 
subsidized exports. 
 
Both scenarios assume that consumption 
and production level off for the next two 
years as the market responds to the 
current surplus of frozen pork and 
relatively high production costs (see 
Figures 1 through 4).  After 1998, the 
WTO concession scenario shows 4 
percent growth in per capita 
consumption and zero growth in 
production.  (Note that the 4 percent 
growth figure is lower than the 6 percent 
figure mentioned earlier to account for 
the overestimate of consumption levels 
inherent in the USDA data.)  The self-
sufficiency scenario shows 2 percent 
annual growth in both production and 
consumption. 
 
By construction, the self-sufficiency 
scenario shows a no-trade situation 
throughout the projection period.  The 
WTO scenario shows a very large import 
level (exceeding U.S. production).  
These figures make a simple point.  
China is in the process of building a 
pork industry in the wrong place.  
Pork that should be produced in 
grain-surplus countries will be 
produced at great expense in a grain-
deficit country.  This misallocation of 
resources will cause Chinese pork prices 
to be much higher than would otherwise 
be the case and will divert Chinese 
investment in agriculture away from 
other, more lucrative, opportunities. 
 
The costs of this misallocation will 
increase over time as China tries to 
extract more and more pork from a 
limited supply base.  Eventually, China 
will be forced to import some pork to 
reduce food prices—much as has 
happened in South Korea and Japan.  
However, Chinese policymakers will 
work to delay this date.  China’s concern 
about pork self-sufficiency can be 
understood when one considers the 
enormous quantity of pork (12 million 
metric tons) that China would require 
under the WTO scenario.  Chinese 
policymakers are concerned about the 
possibility of an embargo or pressure to 
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change their economic and social policies  
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Figure 1.  China: Pork Production, 1986-2007
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Figure 2.  China: Pork Consumption, 1986-2007
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
40,000,000
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
M
et
ric
 T
on
s, 
Pr
od
uc
t W
ei
gh
t E
qu
iv
al
en
t
Baseline WTO Scenario
 
8 Hayes and Clemens 
 
Figure 3.  China: Pork Imports, 1986-2007
-1,000,000
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
9,000,000
10,000,000
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
M
et
ric
 T
on
s, 
Pr
od
uc
t W
ei
gh
t E
qu
iv
al
en
t
Baseline WTO Scenario
 
 
 
Figure 4.  China: Imports of U.S. Pork under WTO Scenario, 1986-2007
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in response to the threat of a trade war.  
Curiously, this concern is less important 
when it comes to grain imports.   
 
The restrictive trade policy will cause 
Chinese pork prices to rise above world 
market levels, and China’s pork industry 
will evolve in a manner similar to that of 
Japan.  There is some good news for 
U.S. pork producers from this scenario.  
China has been exporting between 
150,000 and 200,000 metric tons of pork 
muscle meat (excluding live animal 
exports to Hong Kong) and these exports 
should decline to zero over the next five 
years. 
 
Also of relevance is the perception 
among Chinese policymakers that such 
enormous quantities of imports would 
drive world pork prices up so high that 
pork would no longer be affordable.  
This latter concern is clearly false 
because pork prices in China will be 
much higher under the baseline scenario 
than under the liberalization scenario. 
 
The level of concern about self-
sufficiency among the senior 
policymakers encountered by Hayes 
caused him to conclude that it is 
extremely unlikely that China will 
eliminate its current ban on pork imports 
as part of the WTO process.  However, it 
may be possible to get an agreement to 
tariffy the ban or to agree to liberalize at 
some future date.  Work to achieve these 
goals is probably the most important 
policy-related work that U.S. pork 
producers can undertake.  And because 
policy-driven change is likely to have an 
impact on pork exports to China, one 
cannot justify using a large portion of 
market development funds to promote 
muscle meats at this time. 
There is, however, one possible market 
opening that is achievable as part of 
WTO that, if accepted, would be of 
immediate benefit to U.S. pork 
producers.  This objective would be to 
obtain immediate and unlimited access 
to China's pork variety meat market.  
This topic is the subject of the following 
section of this report. 
 
 
The Potential Market for U.S. Pork 
Variety Meats in China 
 
Chinese consumers view products such 
as loins and tenderloins as uninteresting 
and lacking in taste.  Chinese dishes call 
for small pieces of strong-tasting 
products, and Chinese consumers will 
pay accordingly. 
 
During a May 1996 visit, Hayes 
collected the prices shown in Table 2 for 
pork and pork variety meats at Chinese 
wet markets and wholesale markets.  The 
prices are presented both in U.S. dollars 
per pound and as the ratio of the meat or 
variety meat price to the loin price in 
order to avoid errors due to currency 
valuation. 
 
The direct price comparison shown in 
Table 2 is somewhat suspect because of 
production subsidies in China, questions 
about the exchange rate, and the various 
locations from which the prices were 
collected.  The price ratios are, however, 
an accurate measure of the taste 
differences that exist between Chinese 
and U.S. consumers.  For example, pork 
stomach sells at a 50 percent premium to 
loins in China, whereas stomach sells at 
40 percent of the loin price in the United 
States.  Lungs sell at only 2 percent of 
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the loin price in the United States but at 
20 percent of the loin price in China.   
 
The reason these ratios are so different is 
that, until recently, China has protected 
its variety meat market.  Discussions 
between the author and numerous 
individuals along the Chinese pork chain 
indicate that Chinese restrictions on pork 
variety meat imports are currently under 
review.  One reason for this review is 
that the market price differences shown 
in Table 2 are creating a large and very 
visible black market in imported variety 
meats (mostly from the United States).  
The Chinese government's attitude 
seems to be that some control over this 
market is better than no control. Also, 
the Chinese government is acutely aware 
of recent food price inflation, especially 
in urban areas.  Imported variety meats 
are viewed by urban Chinese as being 
much more palatible and more attractive 
than the frozen split sides currently on 
offer from Sichuan province.  Chinese 
pork producers realize that they cannot 
produce sufficient variety meats to 
satisfy local tastes without producing a 
surplus of loins. 
 
These factors suggest that the United 
States could quite easily obtain a variety 
meat exemption as part of the WTO 
accession agreements, and it is useful to 
speculate as to what might happen if 
Chinese restrictions on variety meat 
imports were lifted and a low or zero 
tariff was applied to imported variety 
meats. 
 
Recently, China permitted the 
importation of selected variety meats for 
sale in hotels.  The official tariff on these 
imports was 44 percent, to which a 17 
percent sales tax was added.  
Discussions between Hayes and Mr. 
Yao, the individual who imported these 
products, suggest that after paying tariffs 
and sales tax, the variety meats imported 
under the official exemption were just 
competitive with smuggled imports.  
This competitiveness would suggest that 
the tariff equivalent of the current ban is 
between 40 percent and 50 percent.   
 
Likely suppliers to China’s variety meat 
market, should it be opened, would 
include the United States (with annual 
production of 8 million metric tons), 
Canada (production of 1.2 million metric 
tons), Denmark (production of 1.5 
million metric tons), and the Netherlands 
(production of 1.36 million metric tons).  
Exporters that value variety meats 
(Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Mexico) 
would not be in a position to supply this 
market.  These potential exporters have a 
combined production of 12 million 
metric tons, carcassweight equivalent.  
Contrast this with Chinese production of 
36 million metric tons and it becomes 
clear that variety meat prices in the rest 
of the world would tend to rise to 
Chinese levels, rather than for Chinese 
variety meat prices to fall to world 
levels.  In other words, China would be 
the dominant market in pork variety 
meats. 
 
To calculate the impact of this 
liberalization on the U.S. pork industry, 
we need to calculate the effect on U.S. 
drop credits of the removal of a 40 
percent to 50 percent tariff.  Because 
U.S. prices would rise to Chinese levels, 
this is equivalent to asking what a 40 
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Table 2.  Price comparison for pork cuts and variety meats in China and the United States 
  Ratio  Ratio of 
 China of Product  Product 
 Price Price to U.S. Price Price to 
 ($/lb.) Loin Price ($/lb.) Loin Price 
  in China  in U.S. 
Loin 1.20 N/A 1.32 N/A 
Lung 0.24 0.20 0.03 0.02 
Pork Stomach 2.16 1.50 0.54 0.40 
Pork Kidney 1.56 1.30 0.17 0.13 
Lard 0.72 0.60 0.25 0.19 
Feet 0.87 0.725 0.20 0.15 
Boneless Butt 1.20 1.00 0.81 0.61 
Ham 1.27 1.06 0.84 0.63 
Tongue 1.61 1.35 0.55 0.41 
Small Intestine 0.70 0.50 N/A N/A 
Large Intestine 0.38 0.31 N/A N/A 
Nape of Neck (incl. bones) 1.32 1.10 0.10 0.07 
Head Mask 0.33 0.28 N/A N/A 
 
 
percent to 50 percent increase in the U.S. 
drop credit would mean. 
 
Prior to the recent surge in U.S. pork 
variety meat exports, U.S. drop credits 
averaged $6.50 per hog.  More recently, 
the drop credit has risen to about $10.50 
per animal as exports have grown.  This 
drop credit does not include all the items 
that could possibly be exported under 
such a ban, such as lard and ears, but it is 
a reasonable approximation of the 
current value of these products.  A 45 
percent increase in the U.S. drop credit 
would add $4.72 to the value of each hog 
carcass, or about $1.90 per 
hundredweight. 
 
This additional value would eventually 
make its way back to U.S. hog 
producers, and it would do so without 
increasing retail pork prices in the 
United States.  In fact, the U.S. broiler 
industry has discovered that new export 
markets for chicken legs and wing tips 
have actually reduced the cost of 
producing chicken breasts, thereby 
allowing U.S. poultry producers to 
become more competitive on the U.S. 
domestic market while at the same time 
improving profits. 
 
Because U.S. hog producers and U.S. 
and Chinese pork producers would  
benefit from such a move while causing 
only a very small reduction in Chinese 
hog prices, almost all participants would 
benefit from such a change.  Therefore, 
it should be possible to obtain some 
concession in this area during the WTO 
accession talks.  The net annual benefit 
to the U.S. pork industry of such a 
concession would be approximately 
$300 million per year. 
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Conclusion 
 
Chinese agricultural resources—if used 
efficiently—would favor labor-intensive 
crops such as vegetables and fruits.  This 
land use pattern would not include feed-
grain production because feed grains are 
land intensive and labor extensive.  
When China becomes an importer of 
feed grains, Chinese grain prices will 
increase dramatically, reflecting 
international grain transportation costs.  
Because it is so much less expensive to 
transport boneless boxed pork ($0.14 per 
pound from Iowa to China) than the 
feed-grain equivalent ($0.54 for the feed-
grain equivalent of one pound of pork), 
future growth in Chinese pork 
consumption should, in theory, come 
from imported pork products.  However, 
the enormous volume of China’s import 
needs (12 million metric tons), coupled 
with a very strong desire among Chinese 
policymakers for pork self-sufficiency, 
makes it very unlikely that China will 
open its pork muscle meat market in the 
near future.  Funds spent by U.S. pork 
producers to move forward this 
liberalization will be well spent. 
 
Chinese consumers are perfect 
complements to U.S. consumers in that 
they each like the parts of the animal the 
other dislikes.  It is the authors’ opinion, 
based on 20 days of interviews with 
Chinese officials and pork industry 
representatives, that China is prepared to 
open its variety meat market.  Such a 
move would allow Chinese consumers 
access to products they view as 
delicacies and that are not effectively 
used in the United States, and would add 
about $300 million to revenues earned 
by U.S. pork producers without 
increasing pork prices on the U.S. 
domestic market. 
The Chinese Market for U.S. Pork Exports 13 
 
References 
Coyle, William T.  1996.  “Agriculture and Trade in APEC:  Current Status and Trends in 
APEC.”  Paper presented at the American Club, Kohler, WI.  April 15-17. 
 
The Economist. 1992.  “When China Wakes.”  November 28, 1992: 5. 
 
Food and Agricultural Organization.  1995.   FAO Production Yearbook 1994.  FAO: 
Rome, Italy. 
 
Huang, Jikum.  1996.  “Agriculture Development Policy and Food Security in China.”  
Report prepared for the Food and Agriculture Organization by the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Agriculture Sciences.  November. 
 
Shaw, I., J. Shaffer, V. Premakumar, and D. Hayes.  1997.  “Policy and Forecasting 
Models for the Chinese, South Korean, Australian, and European Union Meat 
Sectors.”  Technical Report (97-TR35), Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University, Ames, IA. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  1996.  “Annual Livestock Report.”  USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service, Washington, DC. July 18. 
 
 
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
=  
